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Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is well known to cause severe respiratory infection and was first
reported in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2012. We report here the first confirmed MERS-CoV infection in the Kingdom
of Bahrain in a Saudi gentleman who was admitted electively for coronary bypass surgery, postoperatively developed an acute
respiratory illness, and tested positive for MERS-CoV. 40 close contacts, all healthcare workers, were traced and followed with no
documented secondary cases.
1. Introduction
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) causes severe human infections, resulting in a high
mortality rate, and it has the ability to transmit between
humans [1]. There remains a lack of evidence of sustained
human-to-human transmission in the community [2]. Thus
far, the observed human-to-human transmission has mainly
occurred in the health care setting [3].
Human infection with MERS-CoV was first observed
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in September 2012 in patients
with severe pneumonia [4]. The first hospital outbreak was
then reported in a public hospital in Al Zarqa, Jordan, and
involved 8 healthcare workers [5]. As of 10 March 2017, 1,979
laboratory-confirmed cases have been reported to the WHO
with 684 mortalities in 27 countries [6].
Here we report the first confirmed MERS-CoV case
in the Kingdom of Bahrain in a gentleman coming from
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) who was electively
admitted to Sh. Mohammed Bin Khalifa Bin Sulman Al
Khalifa Cardiac Centre (MKCC) for coronary bypass surgery
and developed severe respiratory illness 2 days after his
surgery. The surveillance, contact tracing, and follow-up for
the 40 exposed healthcare workers revealed no evidence of a
secondary case.
2. Case Report
A 61-year-old male, who was originally from KSA and had
a history of hypertension and diabetes without smoking, is
reported here. He was diagnosed with triple vessel disease
in the Aramco hospital in KSA and was advised to undergo
coronary bypass surgery. He was electively admitted to
MKCC on the 29th of March 2016 for surgery. At the time of
admission, he was asymptomatic. He was initially screened
by a nasopharyngeal swab for MERS-CoV per protocol and
tested negative. The patient owned a dromedary camel barn
in Saudi Arabia and had a history of close contact with camels
as well as of consuming their rawmilk for an unknown expo-
sure duration. He had no other significant symptoms, risk
factors, or exposures prior to admission. His initial chest X-
ray on admission was unremarkable (Figure 1), and his basic
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laboratory tests were normal including liver function tests
(white blood cells 6 × 109/L, haemoglobin 13 g/L, platelets
190× 109/L, neutrophils 42%, aspartate transaminase 23 IU/L,
alanine transaminase 39 IU/L, alkaline phosphatase 59 IU/L,
gamma-glutamyl transpeptidase 40 IU/L, urea 4.5mg/dL,
and creatinine 103 g/dL).
On April 3, 2016, he underwent coronary artery bypass
graft surgery (CABG) with no complications. After the
operation, he was transferred to the cardiac intensive care
unit (CICU) in a general bed with no isolation and was
successfully extubated the next day. His condition was suffi-
ciently stable to be downgraded to the high dependency unit
(HDU), which is a step-down unit in the cardiac ward.
On April 5, 2016, the patient was noted to be febrile
(temp 38.5∘C) with mild hypoxia managed by noninvasive
ventilation, and his CXR showed a few bilateral infiltrates.
On April 6, 2016, he was continuously spiking a fever
up to 40∘C with worsening hypoxia; in response, he was
intubated and mechanically ventilated. He was observed to
haveworsening of his CXR (Figure 2).Thenext day, hewas on
maximum ventilatory support and required extracorporeal
membrane oxygenation (ECMO).He developed acute kidney
injury for which Continuous Venovenous Hemofiltration
(CVVHF) was initiated. His liver function tests as well were
deteriorating. During this period, all of his studies were
negative for routine pathogens, including blood cultures,
urine, ET aspirate culture, and respiratory panel, and he was
empirically maintained on Tazocin. Meropenem was later
added.
On April 9 (day 6 post-op), he had not improved. In
view of his risk factor for MERS-CoV exposure, a repeated
nasopharyngeal swab and deep ET aspirate were obtained.
Three specimens, including a nasopharyngeal swab, deep
endotracheal aspirate, and serum sample, were collected and
tested using theMERS rRT-PCR assay.The results confirmed
MERS-CoV infection. On 12 April, he was transferred to a
hospital in Dammam, Saudi Arabia. Later that day, he passed
away.
2.1. Infection Control Measures. OnApril 9, 2016, at 8 PM, the
public health laboratory of the Bahrain Ministry of Health
was contacted (MKCC) to confirm the positive results of
MERS-CoV. At 9:30 PM, a task force team with BDF and
MKCC was formed and was on site for situation assessment.
The index patient was isolated and all exposed patients
were identified and immediately isolated as well. Surveillance
for all exposed healthcare workers was performed. Detailed
environmental surveillance was also performed, and four
areas with possible contamination were identified (CICU,
HDU, Theatre and recovery area, and microbiology lab) and
environmental swabs were taken from all four areas.
As soon as the diagnosis of MERS-CoV was confirmed,
all contacts were listed. We identified 40 contacts, including
physicians, nursing staff, technicians, and others. Nineteen
were symptomatic with mild upper respiratory symptoms.
All traced contacts underwent investigation. NP swabs for
MERS-CoV and serological samples for MERS rRT-PCR
assay were obtained at days 0, 14, and 28 from the date of
last known exposure to the confirmed case. Since the exposed
cases weremostly healthcareworkers, investigations included
detailed information on type of contact with the patient,
protection used during the contact, and procedures done for
the patient during hospitalization.
The infection control team followed all contacts for a
period of 14 days for any clinical symptoms, and a hotline was
available for them to contact infection control officers at any
time in case of symptoms. Familymembers were requested to
have a screen performed in KSA.
After thorough contact tracing and surveillance, no pos-
texposure cases were identified.
3. Discussion
Coronaviruses are large enveloped single-stranded RNA
viruses that cause a spectrum of clinical syndromes. MERS-
CoV is considered the sixth coronavirus that may infect
humans [4]. MERS-CoV is thought to be a zoonotic virus
with transmission from an animal reservoir to humans.
Several studies in the Gulf area have shown a close genetic
relationship between human and camel MERS-CoV [7] and
have demonstrated that humanMERS-CoV infectionmay be
directly acquired from camels [8].
The origin of the virus seems to be the Arabian Peninsula
since most of the clusters and outbreaks are reported within
the same area and 80% of cases are fromKSA [9]; the affected
population either is in close contact with camels or acquired
the infection in the healthcare setting.
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All MERS-CoV outbreaks outside of the Arabian Penin-
sula had index cases imported from that region. Recently, an
unexpected outbreak occurred in Korea that was considered
the largest such outbreak outside of the Middle East area.
There were 187 confirmed cases, and the outbreak resulted
from an imported case with a history of travel to the Middle
East [10].
There have been no reports of sustained human-to-
human transmission in the community. Household trans-
mission is limited for unclear reasons, and nosocomial
transmission is well known in healthcare settings in most of
the reported clusters and outbreaks [9].
There are ongoing investigations to determine the mode
of MERS-CoV transmission in healthcare facilities since the
secondary cases vary in their degree of contact and the role
of environmental contamination has been studied in a few
reports. Interestingly some studies reported the presence of
the virus on surfaces (patient rooms) following discharge or
death, which highlights the importance of strict and proper
infection control practice in healthcare facilities [11].
The latest CDC recommendation is to collect multiple
specimens from different upper and lower respiratory sam-
ples as well as a serum sample to increase the likelihood
of detecting the virus, and a deep respiratory sample has
always been preferred [12]. In one study on 63 patients in
the ICU, MERS-CoV was only detected in 20.7% of the first
nasopharyngeal samples and 76.5% of the first deep tracheal
aspirate samples [13].
In our patient, the first nasopharyngeal swab was nega-
tive. At that time, he was asymptomatic. A second sample was
collected after he deteriorated; this sample was an endotra-
cheal aspirate. Serology tests with the MERS rRT-PCR assay
are not routinely used, but we do not know whether such
tests would have shown the presence of antibodies. Recent
papers have demonstrated serological evidence of the virus
in healthy humans with close camel contact [4]; the patient
presented here had contact with camels and consumed raw
camel milk, which supports the serological findings.
Furthermore, more studies are needed to determine
whether the patient was a healthy carrier of MERS-CoV who
then had the virus activated by the stress of surgery.
Questions regarding the transmission of MERS-CoV are
still under investigation; human-to-human transmission has
been shown in most hospital outbreaks [1]. In our case,
despite having up to 40 healthcare contacts, there were no
documented secondary cases after thorough surveillance.
Since the discovery of MERS-CoV in 2012 in KSA,
no cases were detected in Bahrain prior to our case. This
observation raises a few questions. Bahrain is linked to the
eastern region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by a 25-km
causeway thatwas launched in 1986. It is considered one of the
busiest bridges in the region and has traffic statistics of almost
20million passengers bothways based on 2013 data.However,
despite this heavy traffic and the proximity to an area that is
considered to have the highest reported cases and outbreaks,
this is the first reported MERS-CoV case from that area. The
reason for this observation is not clear, and no serology tests
were performed on camels or humans in Bahrain to evaluate
the genetic susceptibility, antibodies, or possible carrier state.
We cannot confirm whether there were undetected cases.
4. Conclusion
A learning point from previous disease outbreaks occurring
before this more recent coronavirus discovery, such as the
SARS outbreak, is that outbreaks of diseases, especially viral
diseases, can be catastrophic, and they have both social
and economic consequences. The importance of strict, well-
organized infection control policies should be addressed
nationally and internationally. The rates of nosocomial
transmission of MERS-CoV are very high for reasons that
are under investigation. In view of this, hospitals should
upgrade their infection control measures and protocols when
handling suspected or confirmed cases, which can prevent
outbreaks.
We still have insufficient knowledge to fully understand
the transmission mode and risk factors. Given the limited
treatment options, we depend on our policies and guidelines
for reducing transmission.
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